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Abstract 
The rational expectations hypothesis has been criticized for imposing substantial demands 
on economic agents, and this problem has not been sufficiently solved by introducing a 
learning mechanism. I present a new approach to this problem by assuming that 
households behave on the basis of not the rate of time preference but the capital-output 
(income) ratio. I show that households can equivalently reach and stay at a steady state 
without doing anything equivalent to computing a complex macro-econometric model. 
Although households are not required to implement anything difficult, they look to be 
behaving fully rationally, led by an “invisible hand.”  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The rational expectations hypothesis has been predominant in economics since it was 
popularized by Lucas (1972) and Sargent et al. (1973), both of whose papers were based 
on that of Muth (1961), and rational expectations are currently assumed in the vast 
majority of economic studies. In general, a rational expectation is understood to be a 
model-consistent expectation. An economic agent behaves consistently with an economic 
model while fully utilizing all available information.  
 However, the rational expectations hypothesis has been criticized for imposing 
substantial demands on economic agents. It first assumes that there can be an objectively 
correct and true economic model with corresponding correct and true parameter values. 
The hypothesis then requires that the models and parameter values that economic agents 
subjectively hold in their minds and act upon are, on average, equal to the objectively 
correct and true model and parameter values. Because of this property, economic agents 
are assumed to make no systematic errors in their expectations on average. However, can 
economic agents actually generate rational expectations by clearing this significantly high 
hurdle?  
 To generate rational expectations, households generally have to do something 
equivalent to computing complex large-scale non-linear dynamic macro-econometric 
models. Can a household routinely do such a thing in its daily life? Evans and Honkapohja 
(2001) argued that this problem can be solved by introducing a learning mechanism (see 
also, e.g., Marcet and Sargent, 1989; Ellison and Pearlman, 2011), but this solution is not 
necessarily regarded as being sufficiently successful because arbitrary learning rules have 
to be assumed. 
 In this paper, I present an alternative solution. In Ramsey-type growth models, 
the rate of time preference (RTP) is positively proportionate to the capital-output 
(income) ratio (COR) and the capital-wage ratio (CWR) at steady state. These relations 
suggest the possibility that households behave on the basis of COR or CWR and not RTP 
as required in the standard models. COR and CWR have a clear advantage over RTP in 
that COR and CWR can be directly and easily observed, whereas RTP cannot. As is well 
known, we can compute a value of RTP only indirectly on the basis of some assumed 
models: that is, we cannot know whether the computed value is correct, true, and intrinsic. 
Given this clear advantage of COR and CWR over RTP, I present an alternative procedure 
for households to reach a steady state, in which households behave on the basis of CWR.  
 The alternative procedure is very simple. A household assesses whether the 
combination of its earned (labor) income and wealth (capital) feels comfortable or not. 
They are not required to do anything equivalent to computing a complex macro-
econometric model. Furthermore, they are not even required to be aware of any sort of 
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economic model. In this new model, households reach a steady state without difficulty, 
and I show that we can interpret this steady state as the same one reached by the 
conventionally assumed procedure that relies on generating rational expectations based 
on RTP. In addition, the essential nature is unchanged, regardless of whether households 
are homogeneous or heterogeneous. Households appear as if they are unconsciously and 
unintentionally led to a steady state by a mysterious force or an “invisible hand.” Because 
the alternative procedure is far easier for households to use than the conventionally 
assumed procedure and leads to the same steady state, it is much more likely that 
households actually behave as proposed by the alternative procedure rather than the 
traditional one. 
 In this case, the invisible hand does not require an objectively correct and true 
RTP, so the steady state derived by it is not necessarily firmly anchored to some ideal 
state. Hence, the invisible hand is vulnerable in that the achieved steady state is 
susceptible to various shocks and therefore the economy will occasionally fluctuate. In 
particular, heterogeneity among households is an important source of vulnerability, 
because households have to estimate the values of a few key variables.  
 
2  GUIDE FOR HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR  
 
2.1  RTP, COR, and CWR 
Suppose a Ramsey-type growth model in which the representative household maximizes 
its expected utility 
 
𝐸 ∫ exp(−𝜃𝑡)𝑢(𝑐𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 
 
subject to 
 
  
𝑑𝑘𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓(𝐴, 𝑘𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡 , 
 
where yt, kt, and ct are production, capital, and consumption per capita, respectively, in 
period t; A is technology; θ (> 0) is RTP; u is the utility function; 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐴, 𝑘𝑡) is the 
production function; and E is the expectation operator. The production function is 
assumed to be Harrod neutral such that 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴
𝛼𝑘𝑡
1−𝛼, where α (0 < α < 1) is a constant.  
 At steady state,  
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𝜃 =
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 
 
holds. By the production function, 
 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
= (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝛼𝑘𝑡
−𝛼 = (1 − 𝛼)
𝐴𝛼𝑘𝑡
1−𝛼
𝑘𝑡
= (1 − 𝛼)
𝑦𝑡
𝑘𝑡
 ,                  (1) 
 
so 
 
𝜃 = (1 − 𝛼)
𝑦𝑡
𝑘𝑡
                                (2) 
 
at steady state; that is, RTP (θ) is equivalent to COR (
𝑦𝑡
𝑘𝑡
) times (1 − 𝛼). Because the 
production yt is distributed by  
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡 +
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡 ,                         (3) 
 
yt also indicates the sum of the labor income and capital income evaluated by 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
, where 
wt is the wage (labor income). By equations (1) and (3), 
 
𝑦𝑡
𝑘𝑡
= 𝛼−1
𝑤𝑡
𝑘𝑡
 .                                (4) 
 
That is, CWR (
𝑤𝑡
𝑘𝑡
 ) is positively proportionate to COR (
𝑦𝑡
𝑘𝑡
 ). Most simply, kt can be 
interpreted as wealth. Hence, COR and CWR can be simply interpreted as the wealth-
income ratio and the wealth-wage ratio, respectively. Problems concerning this 
interpretation are discussed in Section 6.1.3. 
 An important point is that RTP and COR are substitutable at steady state by 
equation (2); furthermore, RTP and CWR are also substitutable at steady state because, 
by equations (2) and (4),  
 
𝜃 = (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
)
𝑤𝑡
𝑘𝑡
 .                                                (5) 
 
This substitutability means that a household may use CWR (or COR) at steady state and 
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not RTP as a guide for its behaviors.  
 
2.2  Constancy of COR 
Kaldor (1957) noted six remarkable historical constancies, which are known as Kaldor’s 
facts. One of these is the fact that the capital-output ratio (i.e., COR) is roughly constant 
over long periods of time. Recently, Pickety (2013) showed that COR does not appear to 
have changed very much since the late nineteenth century.  
 The constancy of COR has been regarded as an essential element, not only in 
Ramsey-type growth models such as that shown in Section 2.1, but also in many other 
types of economic growth models (e.g., Solow, 1956; Romer, 1986). In this sense, the 
constancy of COR is generally accepted not only as an empirical fact but also as a nature 
that economic theories require.  
 Although the constancy of COR is predicted by equation (2), the equation also 
indicates that, if RTP changes, COR and CWR also change. The effect of a possible 
change in RTP, COR, and CWR is examined in Section 6.2.     
 
3  WHAT HOUSEHODS SHOULD DO 
 
In this section, I present a procedure according to which households behave considering 
CWR. For simplicity, it is first assumed that all households are identical, but this 
assumption is removed in Section 4. The values of α and A are also assumed to be 
exogenously given and constant.  
 
3.1  The procedure  
3.1.1  “Comfortability” of CWR 
A household should first subjectively evaluate the value of 
?̆?𝑡
?̆?𝑡
 where ?̆?𝑡 and ?̆?𝑡 are wt 
and kt of the household respectively, that is, how much labor income it earns and how 
much capital (wealth) it possesses. Let Γ be the subjective valuation of 
?̆?𝑡
?̆?𝑡
  by a 
household and Γi be the value of 
?̆?𝑡
?̆?𝑡
 of household i (i = 1, 2, 3, … , M).   
 The household should next assess whether it feels comfortable with its current Γ, 
that is, its combination of income and capital. “Comfortable” in this context means “at 
ease,” “not anxious,” and other related feelings.  
 Let the “degree of comfortability” (DOC) represent how comfortable a 
household feels with its Γ. The higher the value of DOC, the more a household feels 
comfortable with its Γ. For each household, there will be a most comfortable CWR value 
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because the household will feel less comfortable if CWR is either too high or too low. 
That is, for each household, a maximum DOC exists. Let ?̃? be a household’s state at 
which its DOC is the maximum (MDC), and let 𝛤(?̃?) be a household’s Γ when it is at 
?̃? . 𝛤(?̃?)  therefore indicates the Γ that gives a household its MDC, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑖)  is 
household i’s Γi when it is at ?̃?𝑖. 
 
3.1.2  Rules  
Household i should act according to the following rules:  
 
Rule 1-1: If household i feels that the current Γi is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it maintains the same 
level of consumption for any i.  
Rule 1-2: If household i feels that the current Γi is not equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it adjusts its level 
of consumption until it feels that Γi is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) for any i. 
 
With this procedure, a household is not required to do anything equivalent to computing 
a complex large-scale non-linear dynamic macro-econometric model. It has only to 
subjectively value its self-assessed combination of labor income and capital, and adjust 
consumption to the point at which it feels most comfortable.  
 
3.2  Reaching steady state 
Let St be the state of the entire economy in period t, and 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) be the value of 
𝑤𝑡
𝑘𝑡
 of 
the entire economy at St (i.e., the economy’s average CWR). In addition, let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 be the 
steady state at which MDC is achieved and kept constant by all households, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) 
be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 . The production function is assumed to be the same as that 
assumed in Section 2.1 (i.e., 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴
𝛼𝑘𝑡
1−𝛼).  
 
Lemma 1: If households behave according to Rules 1-1 and 1-2, then one and only one 
?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 exists. 
Proof: Because all households are identical, the values of Γ of all households are identical 
and also identical to the value of 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) in any period. Hence, all households that behave 
according to Rules 1-1 and 1-2 commonly adjust their consumption so as to reach the 
value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) that is common for any i, and therefore 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) approaches the common 
value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) . As a result, 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑖)  is achieved, and when it is achieved, 
𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) = 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑖).  
 On the other hand, because  
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𝛤(𝑆𝑡) =
𝑦𝑡
𝑘𝑡
= (
𝐴
𝑘𝑡
)
𝛼
 
 
for the entire economy by the production function, then 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) corresponds to the level 
of kt on a one-to-one basis and is a monotonically continuous function of kt. Hence, there 
is only one level of kt that corresponds to 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) = 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) because the value 
of 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) is unique and common for any i. Therefore, one and only one ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 exists.  ■ 
 
 Note that even if idiosyncratic shocks occur on individual households, the 
economy stays at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 on average, because if a household’s Γ deviates from its 𝛤(?̃?), 
the household no longer will feel most comfortable. Therefore, according to Rule 1-2, it 
will begin to eliminate this deviation from 𝛤(?̃?) by independently adjusting its level of 
consumption.  
 
3.3  Substitutability 
Next, I examine whether ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 is consistent with households’ rational expectations in 
the sense that ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 can be interpreted as the same steady state as that reached as a result 
of households’ behaviors based on rational expectations. Let ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃 be the steady state in 
the Ramsey-type growth model discussed in Section 2, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 =
?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃. As assumed above, the values of α and A are exogenously given and constant. 
 
Proposition 1: If households behave according to Rules 1-1 and 1-2, and if the value of 
θ that is calculated from the values of variables at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 is used as the value of θ in the 
Ramsey-type growth model, then 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃).     
Proof: By Lemma 1, one and only one ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 exists. By equation (2) and the production 
function, 
 
𝜃 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝛼𝑘𝑡
−𝛼 .                                                (6) 
 
Therefore, in the Ramsey-type growth model, there is one and only one ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃 for a given 
value of θ, the values of per capita capital (kt) at ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃 are subjected to a one-to-one 
correspondence to the values of θ, and kt at ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃is a monotonically continuous function 
of θ. Hence, because all households are identical, if the value of θ that is calculated from 
the value of kt at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 by equation (6) is given as the value of θ in the Ramsey-type 
growth model, the value of kt at ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃 is identical to that at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶. Because the production 
function is common for both ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 and ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃 and thereby yt is subjected to a one-to-one 
correspondence to kt equally for both of them, 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃).               ■ 
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 Proposition 1 indicates that we can interpret that ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 is equivalent to ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃, 
and it is therefore consistent with rational expectations. This means that the two 
procedures (RTP-based and MDC-based) can function equivalently and that MDC is 
substitutable for RTP as a guide for household behavior.   
 An important point is that we cannot know whether the achieved ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 is equal 
to the objectively correct and true steady state. We know only that it is a steady state at 
which all households feel most comfortable, and we can interpret that it is equivalent to 
?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃.  
 
3.4  Responding to technological progresses 
Usually, an economy grows steadily thanks to technological progress. Under the MDC-
based procedure, however, households behave only according to Rules 1-1 and 1-2, 
neither of which directly refers to technology. How do households perceive technological 
progress and respond to it? In this model, there are at least two easy and practical ways 
for households to respond to technological progress:  
 
(a) If a new version (variety) of a product is introduced into markets with higher 
performance but the same price as the old version (variety), a household will buy the new 
version (variety) instead of the old one without changing its 𝛤(?̃?). 
(b) If a household feels that its income have unexpectedly and permanently increased and 
that its current Γ is deviating from (and particularly, is higher than) 𝛤(?̃?), it will begin to 
adjust its consumption such that its Γ returns to 𝛤(?̃?) according to Rule 1-2. Because of 
the permanent increase in income, the household will accumulate more capital to make Γ 
return to its 𝛤(?̃?). 
 
Channel (a) is related to the creation of new technology and Channel (b) is related to an 
increase in productivity, and both are commonly related to technological progress. Hence, 
both channels describe a household’s responses when it faces technological progress. 
Channels (a) and (b) do not require any change in Rules 1-1 and 1-2; this means that 
households need do nothing special to respond to technological progress because they 
already respond to it through these two channels.  
 Furthermore, Channels (a) and (b) and Rules 1-1 and 1-2 indicate that 
households are not required to even know the level of technology (At). Indeed, it seems 
highly unlikely that households actually know and use a numerical At when they choose 
their behaviors, even though they look as if they are behaving rationally (i.e., consistent 
with the model).    
 Note that, in the above examinations, technological progress is implicitly 
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assumed to be exogenous, and therefore the degree of risk aversion (DRA) is ignored. 
However, in the framework of endogenous technological progress, DRA should be 
considered. How sensitively a household responds to new versions (varieties) in Channel 
(a) and to increases in income in Channel (b) will differ depending on its DRA, and DRA 
will eventually influence firms’ plans to invest in technology. 
 
4  WHAT HETEROGENEOUS HOUSEHODS 
SHOULD DO 
 
4.1  Consequences of heterogeneous preference 
In actuality, households are not identical—they are heterogeneous—and if heterogeneous 
households behave unilaterally, there is no guarantee that a steady state other than corner 
solutions exists (Becker, 1980; Harashima, 2010, 2012, 2017). Here, “unilaterally” means 
that a household behaves without considering the other households’ optimality conditions. 
In particular, it supposes that all other households should behave in the same manner as 
it does (i.e., supposing that all households, including itself, are identical). For simplicity, 
it is assumed that only the MDCs of households under the MDC-based procedure and 
only the RTPs of households under the RTP-based procedure are heterogeneous; that is, 
households are identical except for either MDC or RTP. 
 If all households are identical, the value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 is identical among households, 
but if they are heterogeneous, each household’s perceived value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 is not necessarily 
guaranteed to be identical among households. On the other hand, the real interest rate in 
markets (rt) in period t is uniquely determined to be equal to the value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 of the 
entire economy (i.e., the average value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
) and is common knowledge for all 
heterogeneous households. However, a household does not necessarily use the current 
value of rt as its perceived value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
, because the current value of rt is not the value 
of rt at steady state. In addition, the stream of rt is estimated differently by households 
because they are heterogeneous. 
  Under an environment in which the estimated streams of rt are heterogeneous 
among households, how does a household estimates the value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
? If a household 
behaves unilaterally, it will estimate this value on the basis of its own value of 𝛤(?̃?) 
because it behaves by supposing that the other households should behave in the same 
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manner as it behaves. Particularly, a unilaterally behaving household will estimate that 
the value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 is equal to its Γ because the household will basically maintain 𝛤 =
𝛤(?̃?)  by behaving according to Rules 1-1 and 1-2, and it will assume that other 
households should behave in the same manner as it does.  
 Note that a household here merely estimates its own personal value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
; it is 
not required to use rational expectations (i.e., act model-consistently) to obtain this value. 
Furthermore, the estimated value need not be the objectively correct and true one.  
 Because the values of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 that are estimated by households are heterogeneous, 
the capital of each heterogeneous household accumulates differently. As a household’s 
value of 𝛤(?̃?) becomes relatively low, it accumulates relatively large amounts of capital, 
and its 
?̆?𝑡
?̆?𝑡
 (Γ) becomes relatively low. Therefore, by the production function and 
equation (1), the household estimates a relatively low value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 and vice versa. That 
is, because households hold heterogeneous values of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
, any differences in capital 
accumulation are amplified. 
 Because capital accumulates differently among households, there is no steady 
state other than corner solutions if households’ MDCs (i.e.,𝛤(?̃?)) are heterogeneous and 
the households behave unilaterally, as shown in Lemma 2.  
 
Lemma 2: If households are identical except for their values of 𝛤(?̃?)  and behave 
unilaterally according to Rules 1-1 and 1-2, ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 does not exist.    
Proof: rt is determined to be equal to the value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 of the entire economy (i.e., 𝛤(𝑆𝑡)), 
and the capital of the entire economy accumulates according to the value of rt. However, 
each heterogeneous household behaves unilaterally and accumulates capital on the basis 
of its own estimated value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 . A household with a relatively low value of 𝛤(?̃?) 
accumulates a relatively large amount of capital, because a relatively low value of 𝛤(?̃?) 
requires a relatively large amount of capital. Therefore, this household’s valuation of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 
is relatively low by equation (1), and vice versa. 
 A household whose personal valuation of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 is higher than 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) (i.e., the 
value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 of the entire economy) accumulates less capital than it estimated, because 
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rt is lower than its estimated value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 . Therefore, by Rule 1-2, the household 
decreases its consumption to approach its 𝛤(?̃?). However, even after this adjustment, it 
still accumulates less capital than it estimated by the same reasoning. Hence, by Rule 1-
2, it further decreases its consumption, and this process continues until it can no longer 
decrease its consumption. Once it reaches this point, it has to decrease its capital to sustain 
its minimum level of consumption and will eventually lose all its capital.  
 The capital of households whose estimated values of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 are higher than 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) 
decreases. Therefore, the ratio of capital owned by the households whose values of 𝛤(?̃?) 
are lower than 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) to all capital in the economy increases, and thereby 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) and rt 
decrease. Because of the decreases in 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) and rt, the estimated values of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 of more 
households become higher than 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) , and these households also eventually lose all 
capital. This process continues until all capital is owned by the lowest 𝛤(?̃?) household. 
Therefore, if the values of 𝛤(?̃?) are heterogeneous, ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 does not exist.          ■ 
 
The state at which all capital is owned by the household with the lowest 𝛤(?̃?) (i.e., the 
lowest MDC) corresponds to the state at which all capital is owned by the lowest RTP 
household in Becker (1980). The problem arising from heterogeneity in households is 
therefore common for both the RTP-based and MDC-based procedures.  
 Lemma 2 indicates that Proposition 1 is meaningless from the start because it is 
highly likely that households are heterogeneous and Proposition 1 assumes homogeneous 
households. However, Harashima (2010, 2012, 2017) showed that a sustainable 
heterogeneity (SH) at which all optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are 
simultaneously satisfied exists under the RTP-based procedure. In the next sections, I will 
show that SH also exists under the MDC-based procedure.     
 
4.2  SH under the RTP-based procedure 
First, I briefly explain the nature of SH under the RTP-based procedure based on the work 
of Harashima (2010, 2012, 2017).  
 
4.2.1  The model of SH 
Suppose for simplicity that there are only two economies―Economy 1 and Economy 2—
that are identical except for RTP. Each economy consists of its own identical households 
respectively. Let θ1 and θ2 be RTPs of households in Economies 1 and 2, respectively, 
and θ1 < θ2. The population growth rate is zero in both economies. The two economies 
are fully open to each other, and goods, services, and capital are freely transacted between 
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them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. Because the economies are fully open, 
they are integrated through trade and form a combined economy. The combined economy 
can be interpreted as the world economy (the international interpretation) or the national 
economy (the national interpretation). Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is 
used only for international transactions, but because both national and international 
interpretations are possible, this concept and terminology are also used for the national 
economy model in this paper. 
 Because a balanced growth path requires Harrod-neutral technological progress, 
the production function of Economy i is assumed to be  
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡
𝛼𝑘𝑖,𝑡
1−𝛼 
 
for i = 1 or 2, where yi,t and ki,t are the per capita production and capital, respectively, of 
Economy i in period t; At is the technology in period t; and α ( 0 < α < 1) is a constant. 
The current account balance in Economy 1 is τt and that in Economy 2 is –τt. The 
accumulated current account balance 
 
∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
 
 
mirrors capital flows between the two economies, and the economy with current account 
surpluses invests them in the other economy. Since 
𝜕𝑦1,𝑡
𝜕𝑘1,𝑡
 (=
𝜕𝑦2,𝑡
𝜕𝑘2,𝑡
) are returns on 
investments,  
 
𝜕𝑦1,𝑡
𝜕𝑘1,𝑡
∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
  and  
𝜕𝑦2,𝑡
𝜕𝑘2,𝑡
∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
  
 
represent income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other 
economy. Hence,  
 
𝜏𝑡 −
𝜕𝑦2,𝑡
𝜕𝑘2,𝑡
∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
 
 
is the balance on goods and services of Economy 1, and  
 
𝜕𝑦1,𝑡
𝜕𝑘1,𝑡
∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
− 𝜏𝑡 
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is that of Economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between 
the economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies, such that  
 
𝜏𝑡 = 𝜅(𝑘1,𝑡, 𝑘2,𝑡) . 
 
 The government (or an international supranational organization under the 
international interpretation) can intervene in the activities of Economies 1 and 2 by 
transferring money between the two economies. The amount of transfer from Economy 1 
to Economy 2 in period t is gt, and it is assumed that gt depends on capital, such that  
 
g
𝑡
= g̅
𝑡
𝑘1,𝑡 . 
 
g̅
𝑡
 is an exogenous variable for households and firms and is appropriately adjusted by 
the government (or an international supranational organization) in every period so as to 
achieve SH. Because 𝑘1,𝑡 = 𝑘2,𝑡 and ?̇?1,𝑡 = ?̇?2,𝑡, 
 
g
𝑡
= g̅
𝑡
𝑘1,𝑡 = g̅𝑡𝑘2,𝑡 . 
 
 Each household in Economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
 
𝐸 ∫ 𝑢1(𝑐1,𝑡)exp
∞
0
(−𝜃1𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
subject to 
 
𝑑𝑘1,𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝛼𝑘1,𝑡
1−𝛼 − 𝑐1,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼)𝐴
𝛼𝑘1,𝑡
−𝛼 (∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 + 𝑧0) − 𝜏𝑡 − g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡  , 
 
and each household in Economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 
𝐸 ∫ 𝑢2(𝑐2,𝑡)exp
∞
0
(−𝜃2𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
subject to 
 
𝑑𝑘2,𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝛼𝑘2,𝑡
1−𝛼 − 𝑐2,𝑡 − (1 − 𝛼)𝐴
𝛼𝑘2,𝑡
−𝛼 (∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 + 𝑧0) + 𝜏𝑡 + g̅𝑡𝑘2,𝑡 
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where ci, t is the per capita consumption of Economy i in period t, ui is the utility function 
of Economy i, and E is the expectation operator. 
 
4.2.2  SH 
Harashima (2010, 2017) showed in the framework of endogenous growth that, if and only 
if lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
 = lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
 = constant, all the optimality conditions of both economies are 
satisfied (i.e., SH is achieved). Even if the government does not intervene (i.e., g̅
𝑡
= 0), 
if the economies behave multilaterally in the sense that each economy behaves fully 
considering the optimality conditions of the other economy, SH is achieved. On the other 
hand, if the economies behave unilaterally, SH is not achieved unless a government 
appropriately intervenes. The reason why SH can be achieved in the cases of multilateral 
behaviors and appropriate government intervention is that the capital accumulation of the 
more advantaged Economy 1 is restrained because of multilateral behaviors and 
appropriate government interventions. If SH is achieved, the growth rates of consumption 
in both economies are equally  
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
= lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
= 𝜀−1 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 −
𝜃1 + 𝜃2
2
] ,         (7) 
 
where m, v, and 𝜛 are positive constants, and 𝜀 = −
𝑐1,𝑡𝑢1
′′
𝑢1
′
 = −
𝑐2,𝑡𝑢2
′′
𝑢2
′
 is the degree of 
relative risk aversion and is constant.  
 Harashima (2010, 2017) indicates that, in the framework of exogenous growth 
(e.g., Ramsey-type growth models) with a heterogeneous population, SH also exists. The 
capital accumulation of the more advantaged Economy 1 is also restrained at SH in 
exogenous growth models. Hence, the capital (wealth) that a household in Economy 1 
owns at SH is not k1 but k1 + Ψ, where Ψ is a negative constant, and the capital a household 
in Economy 2 owns at SH is not k2 but k2 – Ψ, where ki,t is identical for any i through 
market arbitration (i.e., ki,t = kt for any i).  
 Note that Harashima (2010, 2017) showed that the two-economy model can be 
easily extended to multi-economy models, and the results in multi-economy models are 
basically the same as those in the two-economy model. 
 
4.2.3  Government intervention 
Harashima (2012) showed that if a government intervenes such that 
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  lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
=
𝜃2 − 𝜃1
2
 , 
 
then SH is achieved even if Economy 1 behaves unilaterally, and equation (7) is satisfied. 
When sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, Economies 1 and 2 consist of a combined 
economy (Economy 1+2) with twice the population and RTP of . Suppose that 
there is a third economy with RTP of θ3, and it is identical to Economies 1 and 2 except 
for its RTP. Because Economy 1+2 has twice the population of Economy 3, if a 
government intervenes such that the amount of transfer from Economy 1+2 to Economy 
3 in period t is g
𝑡
= g̅
𝑡
𝑘3,𝑡=g̅𝑡𝑘𝑡 , SH is achieved where k3,t is capital in Economy 3 in 
period t, and  
 
  lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
=
𝜃3 −
𝜃1+𝜃2
2
2
 . 
 
Remember that ki,t is identical for any i through arbitration as shown in Section 4.2.2. By 
iterating similar procedures, if a government’s transfers from Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 
1) to Economy H is made on the basis of  
 
lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
=
𝜃𝐻 −
∑ 𝜃𝑞
𝐻−1
𝑞=1
𝐻 − 1
𝐻
 ,                                             (8) 
 
then SH is achieved.  
 
4.3  SH under the MDC-based procedure 
If SH also exists under the MDC-based procedure, it means that ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 also exists in a 
heterogeneous population. SH indicates that all heterogeneous households are linked in 
the sense that a household’s behavior must be set so as to be consistent with the behaviors 
of all the other households, unlike in the case of a homogeneous population where ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 
is achieved even if the households are isolated from each other and behave independently.  
 The links among households in SH may be voluntarily established by households 
themselves, or the government may force them to be established. In any case, if the links 
are established, each household has to behave consistently with the links. A household’s 
behavior is fundamentally affected by how it is linked with other households, and it 
therefore must obtain information about the links before it makes decisions on its 
economic activities.  
2
21 θθ 
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4.3.1  Estimating information about household links 
It would seem to be difficult for each household to correctly know the links needed for 
SH. As will be shown in Section 4.3.4, however, households do not need this information. 
Instead, a household has only to “estimate” the values of a few variables related to the 
links. Furthermore, a household does not actually need to know the correct links to 
achieve SH under the MDC-based procedure. Below, I discuss a few of the variables that 
households need to estimate. 
 
4.3.1.1  𝜞(𝑺𝒕) at SH 
𝛤(𝑆𝑡) (i.e., CWR of the entire economy) at SH is a particularly important piece of 
information because the values of wt and rt depend on the value of 𝛤(𝑆𝑡). By equation 
(3), the value of wt is determined by 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑡 in period t, and because rt is equal 
to the value of 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
 of the entire economy, the value of wt depends on 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) by equation 
(1). Therefore, each household must estimate a value of 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) to behave consistently 
with SH. Let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 be the steady state at which MDC is achieved and kept constant 
by all households when households’ MDCs are heterogeneous (i.e., SH in a heterogeneous 
population under the MDC-based procedure), and let 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 =
?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻.  
 A household will estimate the values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻)  in various ways. An 
important piece of information will be a household’s recognition of how much it feels 
either richer or poorer than other households. If a household feels poorer than the average 
household, it will estimate that 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) is lower than its Γ because it believes that 
the average household has a larger amount of wealth than it actually has. Therefore, the 
poorer a household feels, the lower its perceived value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) than its Γ, and the 
richer it feels, the higher the value.  
 
4.3.1.2  Net transfers from government 
A household must also estimate the amount of government transfers (gt) for it to behave 
consistently with SH. These transfers can take various forms. In some cases, a household 
will receive benefits from the government, but in other cases, it will pay taxes and bear 
other burdens. Let “net transfer” be the benefits from the government minus the burdens 
imposed by it with regard to SH in every period, and let T be the net transfer that a 
household receives. Specifically, let Ti be the net transfer that household i receives (i = 
1,2,3, … , M). 
 Equation (2) implies that the RTP (θ) of a household is positively proportionate 
to its 𝛤(?̃?). Equation (8) implies that a household whose value of 𝛤(?̃?) is larger than the 
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average 𝛤(?̃?) will basically receive positive net transfers, and one whose value of 𝛤(?̃?) 
is smaller than the average will basically receive negative net transfers. In addition, the 
net transfer increases (decreases) as the value of 𝛤(?̃?) increases (decreases).  
 Because the production function is 
𝑦𝑡
𝑘𝑡
= 𝐴𝛼𝑘𝑡
−𝛼
, when a household’s value of 
𝛤(?̃?) is relatively high, its values of kt and yt will be relatively low at SH, which implies 
that a household with a relatively high value of 𝛤(?̃?) is relatively poor and vice versa. 
Because the amount of net transfer will be correlated with the value of 𝛤(?̃?), as shown 
above, how much a household feels poorer or richer than other households will therefore 
also provide an important piece of information as they try to estimate T. If a household 
feels poorer than the average household, it will estimate that it will receive a positive net 
transfer, and as it feels poorer, it will estimate that it will receive a larger net transfer.  
 In addition, the amount of net transfer that a household currently receives will 
be directly observable to a considerable extent, and such direct observations will provide 
important information for households when estimating T.  
 
4.3.1.3  Numerical adjustment to the raw (unadjusted) value of Γ 
Suppose that a household’s 𝛤(?̃?) is not affected by its estimated value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻); 
that is, it is constant regardless of the household’s estimated value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻). On the 
other hand, a household’s raw (unadjusted) value of Γ will take various values depending 
on its estimated value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) , because wt, rt, T and Ψ differ depending on 
𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻). In addition, the capital (wealth) that a household owns consist of not only kt 
but Ψ under SH as shown in Section 4.2.2. Therefore, it is possible that even if a 
household’s current state is MDC, its raw (unadjusted) value of Γ is not equal to its 
constant value of 𝛤(?̃?), and the household may therefore wrongly begin to deviate from 
its MDC state. That is, it is meaningless to simply compare the raw (unadjusted) value of 
Γ with 𝛤(?̃?). A household has to make numerical adjustments to its raw (unadjusted) 
value of Γ on the basis of the information about its estimated values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻), wt, 
rt, T and Ψ, so as to make the comparison with 𝛤(?̃?) meaningful.  
 Let ΓR be a household’s numerically adjusted value of Γ based on the information 
it has about its estimated values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻), wt, rt, T and Ψ. Specifically, let ΓR,i be ΓR 
of household i.  
 Note that households may actually make numerical adjustments to 𝛤(?̃?) rather 
than Γ, but it is assumed that households make numerical adjustments to Γ, not 𝛤(?̃?) in 
this paper.   
 
4.3.2  SH and the level of inequality 
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Before a government can intervene, it also has to know the necessary links among 
households for SH to be achieved. As with households, however, it will be very difficult 
for a government to know each individual household’s links with other households 
because it cannot know the correct and true RTP of each household. Hence, not only 
households but also a government has to estimate the links.  
 How then does a government estimate the links? An important aspect of SH is 
that, even though households are heterogeneous, the level of inequality neither increases 
nor decreases at SH because SH indicates a steady state. If SH is not achieved, however, 
the level of economic inequality will continue to increase or decrease. As Harashima 
(2010, 2017) showed, if it continues to increase, less-advantaged households will resist 
the government in various ways to urge it to act to achieve SH (e.g., they will vote against 
the incumbent government in elections). On the other hand, if a government takes 
measures to decrease the level of economic inequality, more-advantaged households will 
oppose the measures. Therefore, the way in which households vote in response to 
measures to increase or decrease the level of economic inequality represents an important 
piece of information about the household SH links. Conversely, whether the level of 
inequality increases, decreases, or is unchanged can also be used as a necessary (but not 
sufficient) criterion to judge whether SH has been achieved.  
 According to the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs 1957), a government will 
intervene up to the point at which the number of votes cast in response to increases in the 
level of economic inequality is equivalent to that in response to decreases in elections. At 
this level of intervention, the level of economic inequality will be kept nearly constant, 
so a necessary condition for SH is satisfied at this state even though it is unknown whether 
this state is actually SH. A government may quit imposing measures to institute change 
because it interprets that SH is already achieved at this state.   
 
4.3.3  Revised and additional rules 
Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 indicate that the rules of households in a heterogeneous 
population cannot be the same as those in a homogeneous population (Rules 1-1 and 1-
2). A new government rule must also be introduced. 
 
4.3.3.1  Rules for households 
Considering the requirement for households to achieve SH shown in Section 4.3.1, the 
household rules (Rules 1-1 and 1-2) have to be revised in a heterogeneous population as 
follows:  
 
Rule 2-1: If household i feels that the current ΓR,i is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it maintains the same 
level of consumption as before for any i. 
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Rule 2-2: If household i feels that the current ΓR,i is not equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it adjusts its level 
of consumption or revises its estimated value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) so that it perceives that ΓR,i 
is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) for any i.  
 
The essential natures of Rules 1-1 and 1-2 are preserved in Rules 2-1 and 2-1: a household 
should feel comfortable and adjust consumption until it feels most comfortable. It still 
does not need to do anything equivalent to computing a complex large-scale non-linear 
dynamic macro-econometric model. However, in a heterogeneous population, a 
household is also required to estimate the values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻), T, and ΓR.  
 
4.3.3.2  Rule for the government 
According to the argument presented in Section 4.3.2, a government can roughly achieve 
SH by making the number of votes cast in response to increases in the level of economic 
inequality equivalent to that in response to decreases in elections. Considering this nature, 
the following rule for a government is introduced.  
 
Rule 3: The government adjusts Ti for some i if necessary so as to make the number of 
votes cast in response to increases in the level of economic inequality equivalent to that 
in response to decreases in elections. 
 
4.3.4  Reaching SH  
According to Rules 2-1 and 2-2, each household behaves so as to reach its ?̃? , fully 
considering its estimated values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻), T, and ΓR, while the government behaves 
according to Rule 3. 
 
4.3.4.1  No guarantee of ?̃?MDC, SH 
Even if households and the government behave according to Rules 2-1, 2-2, and 3, there 
is no guarantee that the economy can reach ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻. Let ?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙 be the state at which all 
households feel that their MDCs are achieved; that is, they feel that the current state (?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙) 
is identical to their severally estimated states of ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 . Let 𝛤(?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 
𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙. By households behaving according to Rules 2-1 and 2-2, ?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙 can be realized 
at least temporarily. However, once realized, ?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙 will not necessarily be stable because 
there is no guarantee that each household’s estimated 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻)  is identical to 
𝛤(?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙). Rather, 𝛤(?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙) is usually different from most households’ estimated values of 
𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻)  because these estimated values are probably heterogeneous. Hence, the 
capital of the entire economy will not accumulate and the wage will not be determined as 
most households estimated. As a result, households’ values of ΓR will begin to deviate 
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from the current values even though each of them feels that its current ΓR is equal to its 
𝛤(?̃?) . Therefore, the current ?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙  cannot stay unchanged, and ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻  cannot 
necessarily always exist. 
 In addition, even if a government behaves according to Rule 3, it cannot achieve 
SH precisely because (1) Rule 3 satisfies only a necessary condition for SH as argued in 
Section 4.3.2 and (2) there are some technical problems such that the amount of net 
transfer to each household cannot be precisely equal to what is needed to achieve SH. For 
example, transfers are usually adjusted stepwise and cannot be fine-tuned on a household 
basis. Hence, it is not necessarily guaranteed that the amounts of net transfers for most 
households are exactly equal to what is needed to achieve SH.   
 
4.3.5.2  Approximate SH 
Although ?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙 is not stable and will change, it will eventually reach a state of about  
?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 because the government adjusts Ti for some i if necessary according to Rule 3. 
In response to the government’s adjustment of Ti, households will revise their estimated 
values of Ti and ΓR,i, and, furthermore, of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻). Moreover, the government may 
also revise its estimated value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) if the number of votes cast in response to 
increases in the level of economic inequality is not equivalent to that in response to 
decreases in elections. As a result, ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 that the government estimates and ?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙 will 
gradually converge at a unique state at least approximately. Because of the behavior of 
the government according to Rule 3, the number of votes cast in response to increases in 
the level of economic inequality will be eventually kept equivalent to that in response to 
decreases, and therefore the ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻  that the government estimates and ?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙  will 
eventually be approximately fixed. That is, ?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙 will eventually become approximately 
identical to ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻.   
 As shown in Section 4.3.4.1, government transfers are usually adjusted stepwise. 
Households are put into several categories according to their income and wealth, and the 
amount of net transfer to a household differs depending on the category to which it 
belongs, but all households in the same category receive the same amount. Here, suppose 
that the net transfer that a household receives is smaller than its estimated T, indicating 
that the household’s actual income is smaller than it estimated, and therefore its capital 
(wealth) begins to decrease. This means that the household becomes poorer. Hence, the 
government revises the category to which it belongs to the one similarly poor households 
belong to. Thereby, the household can receive a larger amount of net transfers than it did 
previously. The resulting amount of net transfer may exceed its estimated T. Consequently, 
the household’s income and capital will begin to increase. This kind of cycle will be 
continuously repeated, and the household will go back and forth around ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻. Most 
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households will similarly move around ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 , which means that the economy will 
approximately remain at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻.  
 On the other hand, households may occasionally revise their estimated values of 
𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) , T, and ΓR simply because they guess that they wrongly estimated 
𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) . As a consequence of such occasional revisions (i.e., trial and error), the 
estimated values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) of most households may roughly converge at a unique 
value. The degree of instability of ?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙  will be mitigated to some extent by these 
occasional revisions.  
 Therefore, thanks to the government’s intervention and other factors, SH will be 
approximately achieved. Let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 be the state at which ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 is approximately 
achieved, as described above. Let also 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝)  be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡)  at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝  on 
average. The term “on average” is added because households go back and forth around 
?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 . Because 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝) is the averaged value, a value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝) is 
uniquely determined for any ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 . Similarly, let Γi,ap be Γi at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝  on 
average for any i. A value of Γi,ap is also uniquely determined for ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝. In addition, 
for the previously discussed reasons, the net transfer to a household will fluctuate at 
?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝, but it will be constant on average. Let Ti,ap be the net transfer that household 
i receives on average from the government at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝. A value of Ti,ap is also uniquely 
determined for ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝.  
 
Lemma 3: If households are identical except for their values of 𝛤(?̃?)  and behave 
unilaterally according to Rules 2-1 and 2-2, and if the government behaves according to 
Rule 3, then ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 exists.    
Proof: Because households behave according to Rules 2-1 and 2-2, the economy will 
reach ?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙, although it may not be stable. Because of the government’s adjustment of Ti 
for some i according to Rule 3 and the consequent revisions of households’ severally 
estimated values of Ti, ΓR,i, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) and the government’s estimated values of 
𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) , ?̃?𝐵𝑒𝑙 and ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 will approximately converge and will be maintained 
approximately in the state at which the number of votes cast in response to increases in 
the level of economic inequality is equivalent to that in response to decreases in elections, 
indicating that ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 exists.                                          ■ 
 
 An important point is that ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 exists no matter what values of T, ΓR , and 
𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) are severally estimated by households. These estimated values need not be 
objectively correct and true. 
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4.3.5  Substitutability 
4.3.5.1  SH under the RTP-based procedure 
Under the RTP-based procedure in a heterogeneous population, both households and the 
government have to generate rational expectations in order to reach SH. Let ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 be 
the steady state that satisfies SH under the RTP-based procedure when households are 
identical except for their RTPs, and let 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻. 
 
4.3.5.2  Substitutability between MDC- and RTP-based procedures 
As was the case for ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 and ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃 in Proposition 1, we can interpret ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 as 
?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 as Proposition 2 shows. Let θi be RTP of household i (i = 1, 2, 3, … , M). 
Remember that, as shown in Section 4.2.2, ki,t is identical for any i through arbitration in 
markets even in a heterogeneous population, and therefore, ki,t is equal to kt of the 
economy. That is, ki,t does not simply indicate the capital owned by household i because 
Ψ exists. 
 
Proposition 2: If households are identical except for their values of 𝛤(?̃?) and behave 
unilaterally according to Rules 2-1 and 2-2, if the government behaves according to Rule 
3, and if the value of θi that is calculated back from the values of variables at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 
is used as the value of θi for any i under the RTP-based procedure in which households 
are identical except for their RTPs, then 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻).  
Proof: By Lemma 3, ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 exists. On the other hand, as shown in Section 4.2,  
?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 exists for a given set of θi, and Ti and kt are uniquely determined at ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻. By 
equation (8), it is possible to calculate back θi for any i from the values of T1,ap, T2,ap, … , 
TM,ap and kt at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝. If the value of θi that is calculated back from these values is 
given as the value of θi under the RTP-based procedure for any i, then kt and Ti at ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 
are identical to kt and Ti,ap at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 for any i. Because the production function is 
common for both MDC- and RTP-based procedures and thereby yt is subject to a one-to-
one correspondence to kt equally for both, Γi at ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 is identical to Γi,ap at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 
for any i. Therefore,𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻).                              ■ 
 
 Proposition 2 indicates that we can interpret that ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 is equivalent to 
?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻, although it is unknown whether the back-calculated value of θi is the objectively 
correct, true, and intrinsic value of RTP of household i. Nevertheless, whether or not it is 
the objectively correct, true, and intrinsic value does not matter if households use the 
MDC-based procedure. In addition, Proposition 2 indicates that because 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝) 
exists no matter what values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) and T are severally estimated by households 
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as indicated in Lemma 3, 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝) holds for any estimated values 
of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) and T. That is, no matter what values of T, ΓR, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) are 
severally estimated by households, any ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 can be regarded as the objectively 
correct and true steady state.  
 In addition, Proposition 2 means that a government need not necessarily provide 
the objectively correct Ti,ap for SH. It only needs to make the number of votes cast in 
response to increases in the level of economic inequality equivalent to that in response to 
decreases in elections. Even if Ti,ap is not objectively correct, 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻)  = 
𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝) is achieved as Proposition 2 shows, and a government is therefore not 
required to do any more.  
 
5  INVISIBLE HAND 
 
5.1  MDC- and RTP-based procedures: Which is actually used? 
Households can use both the MDC- and RTP-based procedures to reach a steady state, 
but which procedure more likely to be used by them in daily life? It is much more likely 
that households would choose the more practical and easily usable procedure.  
 The MDC-based procedure has an important advantage over the RTP-based 
procedure in that CWR can be directly and easily observed by households, but RTP cannot. 
Although we can use models to compute the numerical values of households’ RTPs 
indirectly, we cannot know whether the computed numerical values are correct and true. 
Although it is hard to know the correct and true numerical RTP values, under the RTP-
based procedure, the initial consumption level that a household sets can be determined 
only after it calculates the saddle path to steady state on the basis of the correct and true 
RTP values that all households possess in their minds; that is, knowing the correct and 
true RTP values ex ante is indispensable under the RTP-based procedure. Clearly, a 
household is required to engage in more complicated behavior under the RTP-based 
procedure than under the MDC-based procedure.  
 Nevertheless, even under the MDC-based procedure, households need to 
estimate the values of a few variables, but there is an important difference between this 
process and that of rational expectations. The estimated values under the MDC-based 
procedure need not be objectively correct and true, but rational expectations under the 
RTP-based procedure need to be correct, at least on average— otherwise the economy 
cannot reach the steady state.  
 Even if the correct and true numerical values of RTP could be known, however, 
another and more difficult problem must still be solved in the RTP-based procedure. A 
household must generate rational expectations—that is, it must calculate the saddle path 
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to steady state on the basis of the values of all households’ RTPs to reach steady state. A 
household’s initial consumption level can be set only after it has accomplished something 
equivalent to computing a complex large-scale non-linear dynamic macro-econometric 
model and thereby eventually finding the optimal consumption path. On the other hand, 
under the MDC-based procedure, all a household needs to do is simply estimate a few 
variable values and then adjust its behavior on the basis of its level of comfort with these 
estimated values.  
 In addition, there is indirect evidence against the RTP-based procedure. Even 
before modern economics emerged, households looked as if they behaved rationally—
that is, model-consistently. The fact that people behaved without any economic model in 
mind indicates that the RTP-based procedure could not have been used by households 
until recently. Moreover, in the early period when modern economics emerged, the 
economic models were constructed on the basis of observations and data for the periods 
before these models were constructed. Hence, if these models well describe rational 
(model-consistent) household behaviors, it means that households actually could behave 
rationally (model-consistently) without any economic model in mind (i.e., before modern 
economics emerged). Of course, it is highly likely that even today, the vast majority of 
people are completely unaware of the models. 
 The RTP-based procedure imposes extraordinarily difficult (almost impossible) 
requirements on households. Clearly, the MDC-based procedure is far easier for 
households to use than the RTP-based procedure, so it is hard to imagine that they choose 
the RTP-based procedure. It is therefore highly likely that households actually behave 
according the MDC-based procedure, not the RTP-based one. 
 
5.2  Invisible hand 
Unlike the case under the RTP-based procedure, a household need not have any economic 
model in mind under the MDC-based procedure 
 and furthermore it can behave without even being conscious that it is acting under the 
MDC-based procedure and still reach ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 . Households look as if they are 
unconsciously and unintentionally led to ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝  by a mysterious force, or an 
“invisible hand.” 
 Of course, the meaning of the invisible hand mentioned above is not the same as 
that used by Adam Smith (1776). Nevertheless, because ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 can be reached 
without government interventions in a homogeneous population, the term as used both by 
Adam Smith and in this paper describes self-interested behaviors that result in a socially 
desirable state. However, in a heterogeneous population, ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝  will usually be 
achieved only with the help of government interventions, and therefore using the term 
“invisible hand” may be somewhat misleading. 
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6  VULNERABILITY OF THE INVISIBLE HAND 
 
6.1  Difficulties in estimating 𝜞(?̃?𝑴𝑫𝑪,𝑺𝑯), T, and ΓR 
An important problem with the invisible hand discussed in the previous section is that 
?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝  crucially depends on the estimated values of a few variables (i.e., 
𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻), T, and ΓR). Because these values will generally be estimated with incomplete 
information, ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝  will be vulnerable to various shocks and could occasionally 
fluctuate widely.  
 
6.1.1  Limited information 
When a household estimates these values, it can access only limited information about 
various aspects of the economy. A household can know only very limited types and 
amounts of information through its own direct experiences. Hence, most of the 
information it uses will be publicly disseminated. Even that, however, will not be 
comprehensive and, more importantly, it may not necessarily be correct and may even be 
purposefully distributed misleading or incorrect information. Therefore, the estimated 
values may be vulnerable to various shocks imposed by different kinds of newly obtained 
information. 
 
6.1.2  Permanent capital and income 
The CWR used under the MDC-based procedure conceptually should be the ratio of 
permanent labor income to permanent capital. Hence, the value of CWR should be 
modified by removing any temporal elements, but this modification may not be easy.   
 
6.1.3  Capital or wealth 
Conceptually, CWR should be the ratio of labor income to capital, not wealth. However, 
a household may not easily know how much capital it possesses, whereas it is much easier 
to know how much wealth it possesses. Even though the concepts of capital and wealth 
are technically different, it seems likely that many households would use wealth as a 
substitute for capital when determining their levels of comfortability. 
 A problem in this substitution is that the prices of various kinds of wealth 
fluctuate more widely and frequently than both the general price level and the prices of 
capital. This means that households will often potentially be confused by fluctuations in 
prices, and their estimated values of CWR may become biased. This vulnerability can be 
exploited; for example, Harashima (2015, 2018a) showed the possibility that bluffers can 
generate a bubble-like phenomenon by exploiting the opportunities this vulnerability 
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generates (e.g., by manipulating the prices of some assets). 
 
6.2  Revision of the estimated 𝜞(?̃?𝑴𝑫𝑪,𝑺𝑯) as RTP shock  
Because of these vulnerabilities, households will occasionally revise their estimated 
values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻), T, and ΓR when new pieces of information arrive or some kinds of 
shocks are recognized. Nevertheless, idiosyncratic revisions by individual households 
will not have a huge impact on the entire economy. For a revision to cause a large shock 
to the economy, the estimated values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) of many households need to be 
simultaneously revised.  
 An occurrence of simultaneous revisions of the estimated 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) under 
the MDC-based procedure corresponds to a shock on the expected RTP of a representative 
household under the RTP-based procedure. In this sense, a shock on the estimated 
𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) is equivalent to that on the RTP of the representative household. Harashima 
(2014) showed that it is very difficult for a household to generate the expected RTP of 
the representative household, and therefore it is generated heuristically.  
 
6.2.1  Effects of simultaneous revision of the estimated 𝜞(?̃?𝑴𝑫𝑪,𝑺𝑯) 
under the MDC-based procedure 
Suppose that, because of some new information that becomes simultaneously known to 
all households, the estimated values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) of all households are simultaneously 
revised upward, and all households perceive these simultaneous revisions. As mentioned 
above, this situation is equivalent to an upward RTP shock under the RTP-based 
procedure. Because of the increases in the estimated values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻), households 
begin to guess that wt and the net transfers they receive from the government will become 
smaller in the future than they had previously estimated. In other words, they begin to 
feel poorer. Because they begin to estimate smaller incomes while capital remains 
unchanged, the households begin to feel that their current values of ΓR are smaller than 
previously estimated. Therefore, they begin to adjust the values of ΓR upwards to make 
them equal to their values of 𝛤(?̃?) by adjusting consumption according to Rule 2-2. 
 Adjusting the value of ΓR upwards means that some of the accumulated capital 
becomes excessive and must be reduced, but how can it be reduced? One possibility is 
that a household increases its consumption temporarily to reduce its accumulated capital 
as Rule 2-2 suggests. However, it is highly unlikely that a household will increase its 
consumption because it has to behave strategically after the simultaneous revisions of the 
estimated values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) by all households. During the simultaneous revisions, 
all households may change their actions in different ways. Therefore, the effects of the 
simultaneous revisions on a household will differ depending on the actions of the other 
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households. Hence, a household must behave strategically, and it will therefore not 
necessarily simply increase its consumption as it would in the “normal” case. Harashima 
(2004, 2009, 2018b) showed that, in the framework of the RTP-based procedure, it is 
highly likely that a household instead decreases its consumption together with the other 
households because of strategic considerations. The same result may be observed under 
the MDC-based procedure. Because households decrease consumption, the economy falls 
into a recession and large amounts of resources are left unutilized. Even if such negative 
effects are generated, households will continue to decrease consumption until ΓR = 𝛤(?̃?) 
is restored. As a result, excessive capital will eventually be destroyed. 
 Suppose next the case of a downward revision, which is equivalent to a 
downward RTP shock. Because of decreases in the estimated values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) , 
households begin to guess that wt and the net transfers they receive will become larger in 
the future than previously estimated. In other words, they begin to feel richer. Hence, 
households begin to feel that their current values of ΓR are larger than previously 
estimated, and thereby they begin to adjust their values of ΓR downwards to make them 
again equal to their values of 𝛤(?̃?) by adjusting consumption according to Rule 2-2. 
Unlike the case with upward revision, it is highly likely that households will immediately 
begin to increase consumption regardless of what happens as a consequence of the 
increase. As a result, an economic boom will begin and capital and labor will begin to be 
overused.  
 
6.2.2  Shock on the estimated 𝜞(?̃?𝑴𝑫𝑪,𝑺𝑯) or the expected RTP? 
Although a shock on the estimated 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) is equivalent to that on the expected RTP, 
the former seems to be intuitively easier to accept than the latter, because a shock on the 
estimated 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) means a shock to people’s feeling of comfort. It is intuitively easy 
to accept that people will change their behavior if they begin to feel less comfortable. On 
the other hand, it is not easy to envision a situation where people technically adjust their 
numerical values of expected RTP. In this sense, it is much more likely that the actual 
shocks are on the estimated 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻), and shocks on the expected RTP merely mirror 
those on the estimated 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻); that is, the shocks on the expected RTP are not “real” 
phenomena.   
 
6.3  Informational superiority of government 
There is a possibility that a government has informational superiority with regard to 
?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 because it can access much more information than ordinary people can. If a 
government truly has substantial informational superiority, it will be able to mitigate the 
vulnerability of the invisible hand to some extent—for example, by leading households 
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to stay at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 over a long period of time and to reach ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 more quickly 
and smoothly after a shock. 
 
7  DISCUSSION 
 
7.1  Rationality 
A rational expectation has usually been regarded as a model-consistent expectation. 
However, because households can behave without any economic model in mind under 
the MDC-based procedure, this kind of understanding or definition of rationality seems 
to be meaningless in this case. At the least, an alternative understanding or definition of 
rationality may be needed under the MDC-based procedure. 
 
7.2  Expected utility 
An important question arises out of the MDC-based procedure. Are households actually 
maximizing their expected utilities in the first place? We can interpret that they are doing 
so under the RTP-based procedure; that is, they behave on the basis of carefully thought-
out plans made through thorough calculations related to expected utility. However, 
because the RTP (discount factor) is not used in the MDC-based procedure, households 
need not—or rather cannot—calculate their expected utilities. Households behave only 
on the basis of their feelings of comfortability.  
 Even if households do not calculate their expected utilities, however, it does not 
mean that they do not consider the future at all under the MDC-based procedure. Humans 
are endowed with reason and therefore foresee the future and plan for their future actions. 
Under the MDC-based procedure, this future plan is reflected implicitly in the degree of 
comfortability, because capital takes effect in the future and the extent to which the 
current level of capital leads to a comfortable feeling (i.e., feeling secure for the future) 
is implicitly related to the future plan. Households do not want to accumulate capitals 
infinitely under the MDC-based procedure, which implicitly means that they 
unconsciously discount the utilities from their future consumptions. Therefore, 
households behave fully considering the future and choosing the best option for the future 
under the MDC-based procedure. 
 
7.3  The correct and true ?̃?𝑹𝑻𝑷,𝑺𝑯 
Another important question arises. Does the objectively correct and true ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 exist? 
We cannot know the correct and true RTP values of households. Hence, we cannot judge 
which ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 is the objectively correct and true ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻, although any ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 can 
be interpreted to be ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 as Proposition 2 indicates.  
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 This problem may be generated because the concept of RTP used under the RTP-
based procedure is not the same as that used in the fields of psychology and experimental 
economics. Indeed, the examinations in this paper strongly imply that the concepts of 
RTP under the RTP-based procedure and the one used in those fields are not the same. 
The concept of RTP used under the RTP-based procedure has usually ignored many 
observed anomalies that have been reported in the fields of psychology and experimental 
economics (e.g., Barro, 1999), but these issues may have been ignored because the 
concepts are different in the first place, even though it was convenient to use the term 
RTP for the RTP-based procedure. The RTP used in the RTP-based procedure may be 
only a shadow of a true deep parameter X. In this case, it follows that no objectively 
correct and true ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 exists.   
 
8  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The rational expectation hypothesis has been criticized for imposing substantial demands 
on economic agents, such that households have to do something equivalent to computing 
complex large-scale non-linear dynamic macro-econometric models. Can a household 
truly implement such a thing routinely in its daily life? Evans and Honkapohja (2001) 
argued that this problem can be solved by introducing a mechanism of learning, but this 
solution is not necessarily regarded sufficiently successful because arbitrary learning 
rules have to be assumed.  
 In this paper, I presented an alternative solution. Considering the clear advantage 
of COR and CWR over RTP in that COR and CWR can be directly and easily observed 
but RTP cannot, I presented an alternative procedure for households to reach a steady 
state (the MDC-based procedure) instead of the conventionally assumed procedure based 
on rational expectations (the RTP-based procedure). The MDC-based procedure is very 
simple. A household has only to act on its feelings about whether the combination of its 
labor income and capital (wealth) is comfortable or not. Households are not required to 
generate rational expectations and, furthermore, are not even required to have any 
economic model in their minds. For all that, households can reach a steady state without 
difficulty. I showed that this steady state can be interpreted to be equivalent to the steady 
state reached under the RTP-based procedure. Furthermore, the essential nature is 
unchanged, regardless of whether households are homogeneous or heterogeneous. 
Households look as if they are unconsciously and unintentionally led to a steady state by 
a mysterious force or “invisible hand.” Because the MDC-based procedure is far easier 
for households to use than the RTP-based procedure but leads to the same steady state as 
that under RTP-based procedure, it is highly likely that households actually behave under 
the MDC-based procedure.  
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 The MDC-based procedure does not require an objectively correct and true 
model and RTP, and therefore no systemic error can exist. In this case, the lack of 
systemic error means that households can be interpreted to be naturally able to reach the 
same conclusions as if they generate rational expectations in the framework of the RTP-
based procedure. On the other hand, because the steady state is not firmly anchored to 
some ideal state under the MDC-based procedure, the invisible hand has a vulnerability: 
the achieved steady state is vulnerable to various shocks and therefore the economy 
occasionally fluctuates. In particular, heterogeneity among households plays an important 
role in generating this vulnerability. In addition, the examinations in this paper imply the 
possibilities that households are not actually calculating the expected utilities and that the 
concept of RTP used under the RTP-based procedure is not the same as that used in the 
fields of psychology and experimental economics; this suggests that no objectively 
correct and true ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 exists. 
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